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The recent balance—of—payments literature shows that
speculative attacks on a pegged exchange rate must sometimes
occur if the path of the rate is riot to offer abnormal profit
opportunities. Such attacks are fully rational, as they reflect
the market's response to a regime breakdown that is inevitable.
This paper shows that, given certain expectations about policy,
balance—of--payments crises can also be purely self—fulfilling
events. In such cases even a permanently viable regime may
break down, and the economy will possess multiple equilibria
corresponding to different subjective assessments of the prob-
ability of collapse. The behavior of domestic interest rates
and foreign reserves will naturally reflect the possibility of
a speculative attack.
Work on foreign—exchange crises derives from the natural—
resource literature initiated by Salant and Henderson (1978),
where the definition of "abnormal" profit opportunities is
straightforward. Because the definition is not always straight-
forward in a monetary context, this paper also shows how crises
occur in a discrete—time stochastic monetary model when an
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The collapse of a fixed exchange rate is typically marked by one or
more balance—of—payments crises in which speculators acquire a large por-
tion of the central bank's foreign reserves as the bank attempts in vain to
support its currency. Economists have long attributed such crises to
inappropriate domestic policies that ultimately place the central bank in
the uncomfortable position of offering speculators a one—sided bet. The
recent balance—of—payments literature, beginning with the work of Krugman
(1979), tends to support the foregoing view. When asset holders have per-
fect foresight and the current peg must eventually be abandoned, profit
maximization dictates that a sharp attack on the central bank's reserves
occur at some point on the economy's path.' Speculative attacks appear to
be self—fulfilling, since they may occur even when the level of reserves
seems sufficient to handle "normal" balance—of—payments deficits. But
under the view sketched above, the attacks are inevitable, and represent an
entirely rational response to persistently conflicting internal and exter-
nal macroeconomic targets.
This paper demonstrates the existence of circumstances in which balance—
of—payments crises may indeed be purely self—fulfilling events rather than
the inevitable result of unsustainable macroeconomic policies. Such crises
are apparently unnecessary and collapse an exchange rate that would other-
wise have been viable. They reflect, not irrational private behavior, but
an indeterminacy of equilibrium that may arise when agents expect a specu-
lative attack to cause a sharp change in government macroeconomic policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I sets out a simple
stochastic model in which (a) domestic credit may deviate from its
constant mean level only by a serially—correlated disturbance with finite—2--
variance, (b) shocks to domestic credit are small in a well—defined sense,
and (c) agents do not expect any policy change in the event of a balance—
of—payments crisis. In that setting, a run on the central bank's foreign
reserves Is a probability—zero event. The section goes on to discuss the
timing of the exchange rate's inevitable collapse when domestic credit
follows a random walk with drift rather than a stationary, finite—variance
process.2 Section II then relaxes assumption (c) by postulating that agents
expect an exchange—rate collapse to set off an inflationary domestic—credit
policy. Under the new assumption, self—fulfilling runs become a possibi-
lity. Indeed, the economy is shown to possess a continuum of equilibria,
each corresponding to a different subjective assessment of the likelihood of
an exchange—rate collapse. The nominal interest rate in this economy will
at times exceed the world rate; and a positive innovation in domestic credit
will widen any international interest differential, even while the exchange
rate remains fixed. Section III places the self—fulfilling crisis example
in the context of related literature on bank runs, bubbles, and extrinsic
uncertainty. An appendix discusses some technical questions that arise in
the text.
I. The Economics of Rational Crises
The model employed is the simple linear one developed by Flood and
Garber (1984a) and used in Obstfeld (1984a). Under the assumptions made
in those papers (and in the earlier literature), speculative attacks on the
currency occur in a setting where the eventual abandonment of the current
fixed exchange rate is inevitable. Speculation can never occur if market
conditions are consistent with the unconditional and indefinite maintenance—3—
of the fixed exchange rate. After briefly setting out the model, this sec-
tion explains the economics of those results. The next section will give an
example of a scenario under which even a perpetually viable exchange rate
can be attacked.
A small country enjoys perfect international capital mobility, and its
residents consume and produce a single good. If St is the fixed domestic—
currency price of foreign exchange and is the foreign—currency price
of output, the domestic price level is given by for all
times t. If i is the nominal interest rate on foreign—currency securities,
the domestic nominal interest rate i is given by i =i+ E[(S+i/S) —11,
where E[.] denotes an expectation conditional on time—t information. Both
p* and i are assumed to be constants, equal to 1 and 0, respectively. Let
S denote the level of the initially fixed exchange rate.
Domestic money is held by domestic residents only, and consists entirely
of the liabilities of the central bank. Let R be the book value of
central—bank foreign reserves and D domestic credit. Equilibrium in this






Assume first that as long as the exchange rate is fixed, domestic credit
evolves according to the law
Dt =D+ Vt,
wherethe disturbance v follows the covariance—stationary AR(1) process—4—
Vt =Pvi+ (0 < p < 1, Et_i[ct] =0) (4)
nd the innovations are serially independent. The assumptions made above
imply that if the exchange rate is fixed at S and expected to remain so
next period, equilibrium reserves are =aS—D.In this case, the
domestic interest rate and the world rate coincide.
The exchange—rate regime collapses when private domestic wealth owners
acquire the entire remaining stock of central—bank foreign reserves.3 A
collapse clearly presupposes the existence of some lower bound on central—
bank reserves, R.It is worth noting, though, that there is in principle
no reason why a central bank facing perfect international capital markets
cannot borrow indefinitely to support the exchange rate, provided it raises
taxes to service the external debt it incurs (see Obstfeld [1984b]). Nonethe—
less, R is assumed to be an exogenous, possibly negative, constant for the
purpose of the present analysis. It is assumed further that mean reserves
under a permanently fixed rate exceed R, that is, that
aS —D—R> 0.
In the models of Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber (1984a), and Obstfeld
(1984a,b), a steadily growing domestic—credit stock makes a breakdown of
the fixed—rate regime inevitable. (I return to this result shortly.) But
the alternative credit—growth process given by (3) and (4) does not imply
that the fixed exchange rate is unconditionally viable. A large enough
realization of the random variablec (given vi) can clearly drive
reserves to their limit R, forcing an unexpected abandonment of the fixed
rate S and a depreciation. It is convenient to rule Out this possibility
by assuming that Prob [c < (1 —p)(aS —D—R)]=1.(This implies, by
(4), that Prob [v < aS —D—RI=1.)Under this additional assumption—5—
the fixed exchange rate can, with probability one, persistindefinitely.
If the domestic—credit rule described by (3) and (4) is followed
regardless of the exchange—rate regime, domestic credit does not grow
steadily and an exchange—rate collapse can never occur. To see why this
is so, recall first that equilibrium reserves always exceed R if the
exchange rate is pegged at S and expected to remain pegged. Suppose now
that there is an equilibrium for the economy involving the private acquisi-
tion of the official reserve stock on some date T.I will show that the
exchange rate appreciates with probability one as the central bank Is forced
to withdraw from the foreign exchange market. This implies that the
hypothesized run cannot occur along an equilibrium path of the economy. Any
investor who anticipates the exchange rate's path will not participate in
the attack (even if he believes everyone else will), but will prefer to wait
until others have dislodged the exchange rate from its peg so that he can
buy foreign assets at a lower domestic—currency price. Because no one will
wish to participate in the attack, it cannot occur at time T.
To see that the floating rate ST resulting from a run at time T
lies below 5, solve for the economy's rational—expectations equilibrium
under free floating. All official reserves in excess of R have been
acquired by speculators when floating commences. Together with the assumed
international parity conditions, (1) and (2) therefore imply that the
floating rate's evolution is governed by the difference equation
—E[S÷i] + + =R+Dt(t>T). (5)
The saddle—path solution for 5T is4—6—
= +
—'j(a )ET[ + DT+j]. (6)
Under assumptions (3) and (4), ST can be written
STa1( + ii)+[a + (1 —p)}'vT.
Because S > a1(R + D), T < S if VT ( 0.It was assumed above that
VT < aS —D—Rwith probability one. It follows that if VT>0,
ST < a(R + D + VT) < S with probability one. Since the exchange rate
must appreciate immediately if the central bank loses all reserves at T,
equilibrium runs are probability—zero events. A consequence is that the
domestic and foreign interest rates must always coin dde in the present
setting.
The key element n the above argument was the stipulation that no
abrupt policy change is expected to occur as the result of a crisis: the
domestic credit process described by (3) and (4) does not change, and the
central bank withdraws from the foreign exchange market when its reserves
are exhausted. Once the foregoing stipulation is dropped, the equilibrium
of the economy may become indeterminate. As a result, runs become
possible, even if the exchange rate would have been viable forever in their
absence.
Before demonstrating this possibility in the next section, it will be
useful to describe how an exchange—rate collapse occurs in the present
model if domestic credit grows monotonically over time. This is the sce-
nario studied by Flood and Garber (1984a). Consider an economy in which
domestic credit evolves according to the rule—7—
=Dtl+ 1 (E_i[1J] =p> 0), (7)
where Prob [ii>O} =1,for all t.In terms of (3) and (4), p assumes the
value 1 and the mean ofshifts upward. It is assumed again that (7)
holds regardless of the exchange—rate regime, and that no foreign—exchange
intervention occurs after a collapse.
If the exchange rate floats at any time t (and if central—bank reserves
accordingly are constant at their lower limit ), the equilibrium rate S
is again given by (6). Under the monetary regime (7), however,
— —1— —2
St =a(R + D) + ci p. (8)
Suppose first that < S. As in the previous discussion, the exchange
rate cannot be floating in period t. If the equilibrium floating rate when
reserves equal R is below 5, reserves would exceed R in an equilibrium with
the exchange rate pegged at S. This would be true even if the exchange
rate were expected to float in t+1, since the expected depreciation between
t and t+1 would be reduced by a rise in the rate from to S. Thus the
central bank can certainly peg the rate at S through period t unless the
public acquires the reserve stock in an attack. But no individual would
'/
find it profitable to join in an attack that causes an instantaneous
exchange—rate appreciation. (The bank will lose its remaining reserves in
an attack if St =S,but the exchange rate remains at S until the next
period. I therefore consider it "nonfloating" on date t, a matter of
definition.)
What if S > 5? Flood and Garber (1984a) note correctly that the
exchange rate must float in the first period that this inequality holds.—8—
However, the rationale they offer for this assertion ——thatthe condition
S1 > S offers speculators an opportunity to profit at official expense
merely shows (recall the previous paragraph) that if a run is expected, it
will pay for all to join in. In other words, while a path for the economy
such that the exchange rate collapses the first time St > S is an
equilibrium path, it remains to show that no other outcome is consistent
with intertemporal equilibrium.
This is easily done once a precise defInItIon of "equilibrIum' Is
adopted. At any time t the state of the economy is defined by the current
realization of domestic credit D. Following Salant (1983), define an
equilibrium exchange—rate function S(D) by the properties:
(a) for all realizations D, there is a reserve level R >Rsuch that




and (b) S(D) =Sif Rt > R. Then under the central—bank behavior assumed
above, the following result can be demonstrated:
Theorem. If S(D) is an equilibrium exchange—rate function, there is a
critical domestic—credit level D such that S(D) > S if and only if>
The threshold D is defined by
D Einf{D: c'(R+D)+ 2>
It follows from (8) that S(D) =wheneverS >
Proof. It has already been shown that S(D) =Sin equilibrium if L D
(so that S < 5). To prove that S(D) > S whenever Dt > 5 ( in which case
Rt =Rand S(D) =Sr),assume the contrary. Thus, let D'> D be the
smallest level of domestic credit such that S(D') > S (more precisely, the
Infimum of the set of 1) with S(D) > S; this set is nonempty because reser-
ves are limited). I will show that there are realizations of domestic cre——9—
dit D between D and D' such that S(D)S is inconsistent with
tnoney—market equilibrium.
So let Dt c CD, D'). Since > R, money—market equilibrium requires
R +Dt< cS —8E[S(D+i)
—
ifS(D) =S.Define s(D)Prob > D' —Dr].Then E[S(D÷i)] =
+6(D)E[ > D' —DJ
=[1—S(D)]+
I 1._a. f_ +i it+iLi)_JitJrUpjtj.LL uetiueLile pLUL)aUIIiLyueiisiy
function for Thenthe necessary condition (9) can be written:
D '—D
+ f tpg(p)dp . (10)
a[c+S(D)]0
Asfigure 1 shows, the left—hand side of (10) rises linearly with
and > S for Dt =D.The right—hand side of (10) is nonincreasing,
reaching its minimal value S when Dt =D'.It is clear that any exchange—
rate function with S(D) =Sfor D < D' does not define an equilibrium
because condition (10) is violated when Dc(D', D').5
It is clear that the form of domestic—credit rule (7) was a key in-
gredient in the above demonstration that the exchange rate must float as
soon as S exceeds S. The observation that everyone would wish to parti-
cipate in a run if one were expected does not, itself, prove that a run
must occur. The next section underlines this point by providing an example
of an economy in which the exchange rate can remain fixed even if its














































II.Self—Fulfilling Crises: An Example
This section gives an example of a crisis—induced policy change which,
if anticipated, leads to indeterminacy of equilibrium and the possibility
of self—fulfilling or seemingly unnecessary runs. The example involves the
expected adoption of an inflationary domestic—credit growth rule in the
event of a crisis. Initially, however, the exchange rate is fixed at S
and the domestic—credit process is again described by (3) and (4).
Assume now that the publIc holds the following expectation: If a cri-
sis occurs at any time T, the central bank allows the exchange rate to
float forever and switches to the domestic—credit growth rule (7).
There are a number of stories that might buttress this assumption of an
expected regime change. For example, when reserves hit R, the central bank
can no longer borrow externally, and the government may need to resort to
inflationary finance.6 This need is exacerbated by the sharp rise in offi-
cial net foreign indebtedness caused by the loss of reserves to private
speculators. The recent experiences of Argentina and Chile confirm that
financial disorder and capital flight may foreshadow heightened future
inflation [see, for example, Daz—Alejandro (1984)]. While the one—way
causation postulated here is inadequate as a description of those
countries' experiences, the example serves to elucidate a factor that may
have played an important role.7
One equilibrium path for the economy is the one described in the pre-
ceding section. If the public expects that no collapse will ever occur,
there is no run and no switch in the domestic—credit process. Expectations
are self—fulfilling, and the fixed—rate regime never collapses.
I now argue that there are infinitely many alternative equilibria, each— 11—
correspondingto a different set of public beliefs about the probability of
-ajrun.These,too, are self-fulfilling equilibria. Under the policy sce-
nario assumed here, the authorities are expected to validate any run ex
post by shifting to an inflationary policy. The argument of the previous
section, which ruled out crises in the policy environment described by
unconditional adherence to (3) and (4), no longer applies.
As a first step in the construction of an alternative equilibrium, note
that in the event of an exchange—rate collapse at time T, the value of the
floating exchange rate is again given by (8), which is reproduced here with
the substitution DT =D÷ VT:
- —1—— —2 STa(R+D+vT)+c p.
Because a crisis now induces expectations of future inflation, it is
possible that the exchange rate depreciates if the central bank is forced
to leave the foreign exchange market. This occurs if > S, that is, if
1(R ++ VT)+
2
Clearly the foregoing inequality can hold even when the equilibrium reserve
level in the no—run equilibrium, aS —D—
VTexceeds R; it implies that
a run may take place whenever
VT >
—R—D)— C. (11)
Because p > 0, inequality (11) may hold even under the boundedness assump-
tion on c made in section I.
Consider now the following sequence of events. At the start of a
period T, the value of current domestic credit is revealed. Simultaneously,— 12—
anexogenous lottery determines the state of nature. There are two possible
—ates. In state 1, which occurs with probability it, a run on the central
bank's reserves occurs if, and only if,VT > C [inequality (11)]. In state
2, which occurs with probability 1 —it,no run occurs. If state 1 occurs
and VT > C, every agent will find It advantageous to participate in the run
by selling the central bank as much domestic money as possible. Because
the exchange rate is expected to depreciate once the central bank can no
longer peg It at S, agents will flee the domestic currency to avoid a sure
capital loss.
The distribution of events described above clearly defines a stochastic
equilibrium in the special case it =0,namely, the no—run equilibrium of
the previous section. If positive choices of it also define equilibria,
runs can occur, and the domestic interest rate I can lie above the world
rate i even while the exchange rate is fixed. This would be necessary
to compensate domestic bond holders for capital losses expected in the
8 event of a crisis.
Do there exist equilibria with it > 0? The technical obstacle to
resolving this question is connected with the foregoing observation con-
cerning the domestic interest rate i. If 'ii > 0, shocks to domestic credit
may alter the domestic interest rate, and thus need not lead to equal off-
setting changes in reserves. If a positive domestic credit innovation
raises i (a conjecture that will be verified below), the upper bound on C
assumed in section I no longer prevents unexpectedly high domestic credit
creation from driving reserves to R and wiping Out the fixed—rate regime
without warning. If inequality (11) can hold only for shocks that drive
reserves below R, the notion of equilibria with it > 0 is vacuous.— 13—
Toavoid this problem, it Is sufficient to restrict the range of c more
tightly. Assume there exists a positive B satisfying C < B < aS —D—R
such that Prob[c < (1 —p)B]=1.As is shown in the appendix, there
exists a> 0 so small that for it<n, reserves are no less than R in
equilibrium if state 1 has never occurred and the exchange rate is fixed at
S. The crisis probabilities itinthe interval [0,u)definea continuum of
possible stochastic equilibria for the economy in which the exchange rate
is fixed if state 1 has never occurred.
With this more stringent restriction on e, it is straightforward to
compute the domestic interest rate for itin[O,) while the exchange rate
is fixed. Let Dt =D+ v summarize the state of the economy on a date t
when no run occurs. If v1 < C, a crisis cannot occur next period, so
S1 will remain at S. If v1 > C, a crisis will occur with probability
n.9 Defineq(v) Prob[c+i > C —pv].Then by (8),
Et[St÷i] =[1—itq(v)]S+ wq(v){a(R + D + pv
+ E[C+i £+1 > C —pv])+ a2i}. (12)
Equation (12) states that the exchange rate expected to prevail next period
(given that no run has yet occurred) is a weighted sum of S and the
rate expected to equilibrate asset markets in the event of an exchange—rate
collapse. As the latter cannot be lower than the peg S, E[S+i] 2.
andso i =i+ E[(S+i/S) —1]> .lO
Because domestic credit shocks are serially correlated, a higher value
of v (given that there is no run) raises the probability that v1 will
exceed the critical level C at which a run becomes possible. In fact, an— 14—
increasein v causes a rise in next period's expected exchange rate, and
Jus a rise in the interest rate i• To see this, let f(.) denote the
(continuous) probability density function of the random variable c. Then
(1 —p)







=f dc(if q(v) > 0)
—
pvt
so that differentiation of (12) implies
d(Et[S+iJ) —1
dv
=affPq(v) > 0, (13) t
for any ii.Aconsequence of (13) is that a positive domestic—credit shock
may actually reduce money demand, occasioning a more—than—offsetting re-
serve loss.
III. Discussion
The previous section presented an example of an economy in which self—
fulfilling expectations give rise to a continuum of possible equilibria.
Even though a crisis is not inevitable, agents believe that the central
bank will respond to crises by embarking on a program of heightened infla—
tion, The belief that the authorities will (in effect) ratify crises makes
it unprofitable for any individual speculator to hold domestic currency
while a run is taking place.
In this context, balance—of—payments crises are very similar to bank
runs. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) present a stylized, static model of finan—— 15—
cialintermediation in which there are two equilibria: one in which agents
1ave confidence in the solvency of financial intermediaries, and one in
which lack of confidence leads to a run. Both equilibria involve self—
fulfilling expectations because banks fail if, and only if, there is a run.
As section I showed, balance—of—payments crises, unlike bank runs, need not
be self—ratifying. The stability of a pegged—rate regime hinges on the
anticipated response of the authorities.
The model of section II differs from that of Diamond and Dybvig in that
It is dynamic; and If runs are to be made possible, it Is necessary to
endow agents with rational subjective probabilities of runs. This was
accomplished by randomizing over the run and no—run equilibria. Blanchard
(1979) uses this device to construct an example of an asset—market bubble
that "crashes" with probability one. He assumes that when the asset price is
on a bubble path, there is a time—invariant probability that It will return
to its fundamental or saddle—path value next period. The type of uncer-
tainty determining the equilibrium agents believe will prevail has been
labelled "extrinsic" uncertainty by ass and Shell (1983). Those authors
studythe allocative effects of extrinsic uncertainty in a utility—
maximizing model with restricted market participation.Their results
suggestthat a maximization—based version of the present paper's model may
give some deeper insights intothe nature of self—fulfilling balance—of—
paymentscrises.
In their study of gold monetization, Flood and Garber (1984b) give an
example of a self—fulfilling run similar to the one explored above. The
paper shows how an otherwise viable gold standard might break down If
agents anticipate that It will collapse some time in the future. As in the16 —
exampleof self—fulfilling balance—of—payments crises, and for the same
-ason, indeterminacy arises only when agents expect the authorities to
resort to inflationary finance in the wake of a regime collapse. While
Flood and Carber's gold model is nonstochastic, the introduction of extrin-
sic uncertainty would result in additional equilibrium paths.
Flood and Garber (1984a) suggest that the timing of a run maybeinde-
terminatefor reasons different from those explored above. If the floating
exchange rate prevaIlIng after a run can reflect nonstatonary speculatIve
bubbles as well as market fundamentals, the equilibrium floating rate is
indeterminate. This implies that runs can inprinciple occur at any time.
Theexample studied inthis paper explicitly assumes that the floating
exchangerate depends entirely on its fundamental determinants, however
[equation(6)].11 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983, 1984), using a maximizing
model, show how the government can prevent such bubbles by using its fiscal
powers to guarantee a minimal real redemption value for money.
The fractional backing described by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983, 1984) is
an example of an official guarantee which, though never exercised, precludes
inefficient equilibria supported by self—fulfilling expectations. The
depositinsurancescheme studied by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is another
example in this class. These papers make the important argument that anti-
cipated government policies can block the emergence of certain sub—optimal
competitive equilibria. In a sense, the present paper turns that argument
on its head. Expected government actions may lead to undesired outcomes in
economies that would function correctly otherwise.— 17—
Appendix
This appendix demonstrates that the crisis probability it can always be
chosen so small that if the first "state of nature" described in section
II has not occurred, non—collapse of the fixed—rate regime is consistent
with money—market equilibrium.
In order that this be true, equilibrium reserves in state 2 (the no—run
state of nature) must always exceed R for sufficiently small it. By








for all t. I argue that there exists a positive ii such that (14) always
holds for it < it.
Let E [S÷1 c > C—pv] denote the equilibrium floating exchange rate
expected to materialize on date t+1 if a run occurs. By (12), (14) can be
written
cS —— Vt— I c1 > —pv] )> R. (15)
Equation (12) and inequality (13) imply that q(v)(E[÷1 I E1 > —
canbe written as a function of v, ('), where '(.)>O. With
this definition, (15) becomes
(16)
Recall that e is bounded above by (1 —p)B;it follows that v can
never exceed B. Since (.)isnondecreasing, it attains its maximum
possible value at v =B.Let it be the positive solution to
aS—D—R—B—Tr(B)=O.— 18—
Itis now clear that for any it<,(16)holds with probability 1. Thus
L..,r<ir, the fixed—rate regime is always consistent with money—market
equilibrium.— 19—
Footnotes
*JoseSaul Lizondo made detailed and extremely useful comments on an
earlier draft of this paper. I am grateful also for helpful discussions
with Guillermo Calvo, Robert Flood, and Peter Garber. Allerrorsand opi-
nions are mine. The National Science Foundation and the Alfred P. Sloan
Foundation provided financial support.
'The literature on rational balance—of—payments crises derives from
Salant and Henderson (1978), who discuss the concept of a rational specula-
tive attack in the context of the gold market. Salant (1983) provides
further developments. The analogy between external payments crises and
attacks in resource markets is closest in the continuous—time,
nonstochastic setting explored by Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber (1984a,
section II), and Obstfeld (1984a), among others. The essential reason is
that it is only in continuous time that an anticipated discrete exchange—
rate jump generally entails "abnormal" profit opportunities. Obstfeld
(1984b) presents a discrete—time maximizing model in which the collapse of
the exchange rate may involve two successive speculative attacks: one on
the first day of floating, and one the period before. In stochastic models
such as those described below the notion of "speculative attack" becomes
even more blurred if one defines speculation as any reduction in private
money demand in anticipation of the fixed rate's possible collapse. In
this sense, there may be any number of "attacks" before the rate finally
does collapse.
2Flood and Garber (1984a, section III) have already studied this
problem, but their discussion is incomplete at one point. Because the— 20—
logicalstep they omit is critical for understanding the self—fulfilling
equilibria of section II, I discuss it at length in section I.
3The central bank may commit only a portion of itsreserves to the
defense of the exchange rate, as in Krugman (1979) and Obstfeld (1984a).
For the present analysis, I assume this is not the case.
4me general solution to difference equation (5) is thesaddle—path
solution (6) plus a term of the form
-r-4 RK
where K is an arbitrary constant. The saddle—path solution excludes self—
fulfilling nonstationary bubbles by imposing the initial condition K =0.
5Figure 1 incorporates the assumption that the density function g(') is
continuous; but the proof is easily extended to encompass discrete distri-
butions. Using the techniques in Salant (1983), a theorem like the one in
the text could be proved for credit processes more general than (7).
However, this would require the assumption that the central bank pegs the
exchange rate at S whenever possible. The restriction that
Prob[p>O]=1,
also imposed by Flood and Garber (1984a), makes the latter assumptionunne-
cessary.
6The evaporation of the government's credit lines doesnot, by itself,
imply that the private sector can no longer lend abroad or hold external
assets and liabilities. Thus, the home interest rate may remain linked to
f* by interest parity. This would not be the case if thegovernment were
to impose capital controls. Wyplosz (1983) examines the role of controls
in crises.
7Other examples are possible. Multiple equilibria also arise ifagents— 21—
expecta run to provoke an immediate discrete devaluation, but expect no
devaluation otherwise. See Obstfeld (1984a) for a related discussion of
devaluation.
8Calvo (1983)discussesthe possibility that an expected devaluation of
uncertaintiming can lead to rises in the domestic nominal interest rate
and the ex post real Interest rate. Lizondo (1983) relates the behavior of
foreign—exchangefutures prices under fixed exchange rates to similar con-
siderations. Of course, in the Flood and Garber (1984a) model discussed
above, i exceeds j*wheneverthere is a chance that the fixed exchange rate
willcollapse next period.
91tis being assumed that the borderline case =C—pvhas a
zero probability weight.
-°Given the assumed upper bound on the possible realizations of C, it is
possible that Vt S so small that q(v) =0.In this case Et[St+i] =S
and =i.Inequality (13) below remains valid, however.
"In proving the Theorem of section I it was assumed that the
equilibrium exchange rate is a function of domestic credit alone. This
amounts to excluding from consideration both nonstationary bubbles and
extrinsic uncertainty.— 22—
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